



**COUNCIL OF THE  
EUROPEAN UNION**

***Annalisa Giannella***

*Personal Representative of the High Representative  
- Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction -*

RUE DE LA LOI, 175

B – 1048 BRUXELLES

Tel: (32 2) 281 80 44

Fax: (32 2) 281 81 55

[annalisa.giannella@consilium.europa.eu](mailto:annalisa.giannella@consilium.europa.eu)

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/wmd>

***INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR  
DISARMAMENT***

***"ACHIEVING THE VISION OF A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS"***

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**SESSION 2:** What further steps could non-nuclear weapon states take to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and promote a world free of nuclear weapons?

## **Effective Multilateralism**

- I agree with the first general principle of action defined by the WMD Commission chaired by Hans Blix: "disarmament and non-proliferation are best pursued through a cooperative rule-based international order, applied and enforced through effective multilateral institutions, with the UNSC as the ultimate global authority."
- This is exactly the approach outlined in the EU-Strategy against proliferation of WMD, adopted by the European Council in December 2003: support to effective multilateralism, approach based on prevention, co-operation with international organisations.
- In the implementation of its WMD Strategy, the EU support to the multilateral treaty-system and international organisations in charge of verification has been considerably developed during the past five years: Joint Actions in support of IAEA, OPCW, CTBTO, UNSCR/1540 ...
- The EU is continuously working for the universalisation of the multilateral treaty system and assists countries in the implementation of treaty obligations.

**Work towards a better equilibrium between the three pillars of the NPT: avoid traditional focus on antagonism between non-proliferation and disarmament, priority should be given to development of the peaceful uses aspect**

- The antagonism between non-proliferation and disarmament has shadowed the third pillar, peaceful use, except that this issue has been brought prominently to the fore by the Iranian case.
- We need to look at this issue of peaceful use of nuclear energy with attention and outside any theological respective.
- More and more countries will resort to the nuclear for energy production (as well as for water desalinization). It is their right to choose nuclear energy, and it is our duty and our interest to cooperate with them in order to ensure that they get the safest and more secure nuclear civilian programme. The EU, with EURATOM and some EU Member States with very advanced nuclear technology, is best placed to provide assistance in this area.
- Fabrication of nuclear fuel is a costly and complex activity. In Europe, precisely for these reasons, fuel is produced by a multinational industry.
- It is unreasonable from a practical point of view that each and every country wishing to develop a civilian nuclear programme should have its own uranium enrichment.

- And it is in the interest of nobody to have a multiplication of countries possessing a "threshold" capability.
- Let's therefore put aside the proposal that we should distinguish between the "have" and the "have not" as a matter of principle. Let's focus on practical multilateral schemes which should, in addition, benefit of a guarantee given by the relevant international agency.
- There are a number of proposals on the table. We have to examine them carefully. EU Member States have defined some criteria to assess these proposals: proliferation resistance, assurance of supply, consistency with equal rights and obligations, market neutrality as well as safety and security. I am not suggesting that everybody should adopt the same criteria, but those criteria show that our assessment will be made in the most objective way possible.
- Probably the different proposals do not necessarily exclude each other and can fit different cases.
- We should also start to pass from theory to praxis, this would have a beneficial effect in terms of building trust.

## **Need to make progress on disarmament pillar**

- The subject of this session being the steps which could be taken by non nuclear weapons states, I will focus on those.
- There are three issues which require a strong effort by all:
  - starting the negotiations of a fissile material cut off treaty
  - entry into force of the comprehensive test ban treaty
  - general moratorium of fissile material production
- The negotiations of FMCT can not start because a mandate without preconditions is not accepted by all. On a personal bases, I agree that a verification mechanism gives a totally different credibility to a treaty. But to require that verification is agreed in principle before starting negotiations means in practice that negotiations will not start. We, in the EU, take the view that it is preferably to start negotiations and to raise the issue of verification in the context of negotiations.
- The stalemate in the CD is not in the interest of anybody, it deprives the institutional forum for disarmament of its credibility and legitimacy. Non nuclear weapons states should cooperate and put pressure on those who are reluctant to start negotiations in order to restore the role of the CD.
- Not all nuclear weapons states have an official moratorium of fissile material production in place, and those states who have developed nuclear military capabilities outside NPT do not even envisage one.

We should all press for a general moratorium of production of fissile material for military purposes.

- The CTBT is not in force. Those who have not ratified play the game of subordinating their ratification to the ratification of others. This is a recipe for paralysis. the CTBT is a very significant step, and a strong symbolic step, on the way to disarmament.

**Upholding the non proliferation/disarmament regime: promote a sense of ownership**

- It is very sad to listen sometimes to some non nuclear weapon states. It seems that their dissatisfaction with the disarmament process leads them to believe that non proliferation is simply a concern of nuclear weapons states, or more widely of developed countries, and that they do not really need to care about the non proliferation regime.
- We are underestimating the achievements of the non proliferation regime and we run the risk of not working enough to reinforce these achievements. Again, it is in the interest of nobody to have a multiplication of the number of countries pursuing nuclear military capability or to give access, even inadvertently, to nuclear materials to terrorists.
- We should all work together on non-proliferation. This is true for the NPT, it is also true for the UNSC Resolution 1540.
- I am aware of the difficulties several countries have in implementing the provisions of this Resolution. Difficulties in preparing the report to

the 1540 Committee, difficulties in adopting the necessary measures at national level in terms of export controls, transit control, physical protection, etc.

- This is why the EU is cooperating with the 1540 Committee and UNODA in organising regional seminars which help countries to understand the requirements of the Resolution. The EU is subsequently ready to assist countries in drafting their report to the 1540 Committee and in adopting the national measures needed to comply with the requirements of the Resolution (export controls, physical protection, national implementation of CWC, BTWC, AP, enhancement of national capabilities to fight against illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials, etc.)
- By so doing the non-proliferation provisions become a basis for cooperation rather than a barrier or a basis for discrimination.

### **Working for nuclear weapons free zone**

- A major instrument to achieve disarmament is the establishment of NWFZ (or WMDFZ).
- The Barcelona declaration, subscribed by all EU Member States and its Mediterranean partners, sets up this objective. The EU is ready to contribute to launching the dialogue on this issue.
- Again here the problem is that we should avoid that even preliminary dialogue is made conditional on a number of pre-conditions. Whilst it

is difficult to imagine that the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East could take place independently from a comprehensive peace settlement, we should not resign ourselves to the idea that even starting to talk about a WMDFZ, on a very preliminary basis and at least at technical level, can not take place before such a settlement. Such preliminary discussions could even give a little contribution to the other process.

### **Other Disarmament/Transparency issues (Outer Space, HCoC)**

- We also need to address other concerns. The issue of weaponisation of outer space: while we in the EU do not wish to delay the commencement of the FMCT negotiations, we nevertheless consider that the issue of outer space can be discussed usefully. We are afraid the situation is not mature for the negotiation of a treaty, but we are working on a proposal for a Code of Conduct or Best Practices, which could, we hope, give a positive contribution to the debate.
- We should also not forget the ballistic missiles and the need for transparency in launches. We have an instrument, which is far from being a treaty, but which provides useful transparency measures, the Hague Code of Conduct. We should maintain it, strengthen it and universalise it, and all press in order to get all the players to implement it in full.